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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals of New York entered uncharted legal
territory. It decided the fate of a divorced couple’s five pre-zygotes that had been
medically preserved for future attempts at achieving pregnancy.1 In Kass v. Kass,
the court upheld a ruling of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York and enforced a consent agreement signed by the couple prior to participating in
a reproductive procedure known as in vitro fertilization (IVF).2 Recognizing that it
is the inherent role of the gamete donors to determine the disposition of their genetic
offspring,3 the court reasoned that the terms of the prior consent agreement were
sufficiently definite to ascertain the true meaning of the parties at the moment that
the document was signed.4 Additionally, the court reinforced the determination of
the Appellate Division, which overturned the initial decision of the trial court, and
held that a woman does not have absolute authority with respect to the disposition of
fertilized genetic material because her constitutional rights to privacy and bodily
integrity are not implicated until the moment that implantation occurs.5
1

Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).

2

Welden E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science of
Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws which Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL
L. REV. 825, 833-34 n.67 (1999). “IVF literally means ‘fertilization in a glass.’ IVF is
accomplished by combining sperm and ovum in a petri dish where fertilization occurs.” Id. at
833-34.
3

Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992).
4

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.

5

Id. at 179.
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The decision in Kass illustrates a situation where well-founded common law
contract principles were applied to a novel reproductive issue in order to respond to
rapidly evolving technological progress. However, this legal dilemma presents a
variable that warrants special attention. This was not a case where two business
colleagues sought redress from the court to resolve a dispute over the price of
commercial goods. Instead, the parties involved in the case at hand struggled for
control of a possible human life; Mrs. Kass hoped to preserve the pre-zygotes for
future implantation attempts, and Mr. Kass sought to avoid the tribulations
associated with compulsory parenthood. Bearing this in mind, this Comment will
evaluate the decisions rendered by both the Supreme Court of New York and the
New York Court of Appeals. Part II discusses the relevant facts considered by the
court in determining the disposition of the Kass’s five frozen pre-zygotes. Part III
reviews the decision of the Supreme Court of New York, which held that a woman
has the ultimate decisional authority with respect to frozen genetic material, because
it implicates her constitutional rights to privacy and bodily integrity. Part IV
analyzes the plurality opinion delivered by the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York, which reversed the court’s initial holding. Part V examines the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals that reinforced the ruling of the
Appellate Division. Finally, Part VI analyzes the holdings set forth by the New York
courts and suggests alternative methods to resolve dispositional disputes in the
future.
II. FACTS
Immediately after Maureen and Steven Kass consummated their marriage on July
4, 1988, the couple began trying to conceive a child.6 Mrs. Kass was worried that
her prenatal exposure to a fertility drug known as diethylstilbestrol (DES) would
complicate her ability to carry a baby to term.7 The couple soon discovered that the
matter was far more serious – Mrs. Kass could not become pregnant.8
In August 1989, the couple contacted the John T. Mather Memorial Hospital in
Port Jefferson, Long Island, to seek assistance for Mrs. Kass’s medical
complications. Following several unsuccessful attempts at artificial insemination,
they enrolled in a hospital program designed to assist patients in becoming pregnant
through IVF.9 As with any complex medical procedure, the egg retrieval process
associated with IVF causes considerable physical pain.10 Additionally, the odds of a
patient becoming pregnant during the first attempt are slim. These factors invariably
inflict serious physical, emotional and financial burdens on a couple hoping to bear a
6

Id. at 175.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175. “Typically, the IVF procedure begins with hormonal
stimulation of a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple eggs. The eggs are then removed by
laparascopy or ultrasound-directed needle aspiration and placed in a glass dish, where sperm
are introduced. Once a sperm cell fertilizes the egg, this fusion - or pre-zygote - divides until
it reaches the four - to - eight-cell stage, after which several pre-zygotes are transferred to the
woman’s uterus by a cervical catheter.” Id.
10

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/10

2

2000]

KASS v. KASS, BLAZING LEGAL TRAILS

639

child. Modern science has responded to the complications associated with IVF by
introducing a process known as “cryopreservation.”11 In order to reduce the amount
of pain that a patient must endure, several eggs are initially extracted from the
woman’s uterus and immediately joined with the male donor’s sperm to complete the
fertilization process.12 Next, the fused genetic material divides to the eight-cell
stage, and a doctor-recommended number of the pre-zygotes are implanted in the
uterus in an attempt to impregnate the patient.13 The pre-zygotes that are not
immediately implanted are frozen or “cryogenically preserved” for subsequent
attempts.14
Maureen Kass underwent the process of egg retrieval five times and implantation
nine times.15 She became pregnant twice, but was unable to carry either pregnancy
to term.16 On May 12, 1993, before the final egg retrieval procedure, the Kasses
signed an agreement to permit the hospital to cryopreseve any un-implanted prezygotes.17 Along with consent to the cryopreservation procedure, the couple
executed a seven page “Additional Consent Form,” which described the future
disposition of any un-implanted zygotes upon occurrence of circumstances that
would render the parties unable to make a determination themselves.18 Mr. and Mrs.
Kass resolved that, in the event of “death or any other unforeseen circumstance,” the
cryopreserved pre-zygotes were to be donated to the hospital’s IVF program for
approved research and investigation.19
11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.

14

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.

15

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175-76.

16

Id. at 176.

17

Donna M. Sheinbach, Comment, Examining Disputes Over Ownership Rights to Frozen
Embryos: Will Prior Consent Documents Survive if Challenged by State Law and/or
Constitutional Principles?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 989, 1006 (1999). “On May 12, 1993, the
couple gave their IVF physician permission to retrieve as many eggs as possible by signing
Addendum No. 1-1 to the Clinic’s General Consent Form No. 1.” Id.
18
Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176. “The first two forms, ‘GENERAL INFORMED CONSENT
FORM NO. 1: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER’ and
‘ADDENDUM NO. 1-1,’ consist of 12 single spaced typewritten pages explaining the
procedure, its risks and benefits, at several points indicating that, before egg retrieval could
begin, it was necessary for the parties to make informed decisions regarding the dispositions
of the fertilized eggs” Id.
19
Id. First, in pertinent part “Informed Consent Form No. 2: Cryopreservation of Human
Pre-Zygotes” provides: “We understand that our frozen pre-zygotes will be stored for a
maximum of five years. We have the principal responsibility to decide the disposition of our
frozen pre-zygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose
without the written consent of both of us, consistent with the policies of the IVF Program and
applicable law. In the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any stored prezygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order
of a court of competent jurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt to
initiate a pregnancy, we understand that we may determine the disposition of our frozen pre-
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Eight days after signing the agreements, Maureen Kass underwent her final egg
retrieval procedure.20 By this stage in the IVF process, Mr. and Mrs. Kass had
changed their plans and decided that the pre-zygotes should be implanted into
Maureen Kass’s sister, who had volunteered to become a surrogate mother for the
couple.21 Strain in the Kass’s marriage soon mounted when it became apparent that
the IVF procedure was again unsuccessful, and Mrs. Kass’s sister opted not to
continue the surrogacy contract.22 With their hopes of conceiving a child virtually
shattered, the couple filed for divorce.23
Without legal assistance, Maureen Kass drafted an uncontested divorce
agreement that stated that the remaining five frozen pre-zygotes should be disposed
of in the manner outlined in the Mather Hospital consent form.24 Shortly thereafter,
Mrs. Kass experienced a change of heart and wrote letters to both the hospital and to
her IVF physician relaying her adamant opposition to the destruction of the five prezygotes.25 Less than one month after sending the letters, Maureen Kass filed a
matrimonial action requesting sole custody of the frozen pre-zygotes so that her
physician could later attempt implantation.26 Opposing Mrs. Kass’s custodial claim,

zygotes remaining in storage. ... The possibility of our death or any other unforeseen
circumstances that may result in neither of us being able to determine the disposition of any
stored frozen pre-zygotes requires that we now indicate our wishes. THESE IMPORTANT
DECISIONS MUST BE DISCUSSED WITH OUR IVF PHYSICIAN AND OUR WISHES
MUST BE STATED (BEFORE EGG RETRIEVAL) ON THE ATTACHED ADDENDUM
NO. 2-1, STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION. THIS STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION MAY
BE CHANGED ONLY BY OUR SIGNING ANOTHER STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION
WHICH IS FILED WITH THE IVF PROGRAM.” Id. Second, “Informed Consent No. 2 Addendum No. 2-1: Cryopreservation Statement of Disposition” states: “We understand that it
is IVF Program Policy to obtain our informed consent to the number of pre-zygotes which are
to be cryopreserved and to the disposition of excess cryopreserved pre-zygotes. We are to
indicate our choices by signing our initials where noted below. 1. We consent to
cryopreservation of all pre-zygotes which are not transferred during this IVF cycle for possible
use ... by us in a future IVF cycle. . . . 2. In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a
pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of the stored, frozen prezygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF
program to . . . (b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for
biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation
as determined by the IVF Program.” Id. at 176-77.
20

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 177.

24

Id. “‘The disposition of the frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather Hospital is that they should
be disposed of [in] the manner outlined in our consent form and that neither Maureen Kass[,]
Steve Kass or anyone else will lay claim to custody of these pre-zygotes.’” Kass, 696 N.E.2d
at 177.
25

Id.

26

Id.
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Mr. Kass filed a counterclaim requesting specific performance of the IVF agreement,
which bestowed the pre-zygotes to the Mather Hospital IVF program.27
The Kasses stipulated to a settlement with respect to all issues other than each
party’s claim regarding the disposition of the frozen pre-zygotes.28 Though a
judgment for divorce was rendered on May 16, 1994, the custodial issue remained
unresolved.29 Both parties agreed to permit the matter to be decided on the existing
record.30 The Supreme Court of New York granted custody of the five pre-zygotes
to Maureen Kass and permitted her to have them implanted.31 A divided Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York reversed, unanimously agreeing that
two of the three theories advanced by the Supreme Court were unsound.32 The
decision of the Appellate Division was subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals of New York.33
III. SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
On January 18, 1995, the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County, entered a
judgment awarding custody of the frozen pre-zygotes to Maureen Kass.34 Relying on
Roe v. Wade and its progeny,35 the court held that a determination in Mr. Kass’s
favor would implicate Mrs. Kass’s right to privacy and bodily integrity.36 The court
advanced three main propositions in support of its holding. First, the pre-zygotes,
while not considered legal persons, nevertheless ought to be elevated to a legal status
above property.37 Second, because a husband’s rights essentially terminate upon
fertilization, regardless of whether the fertilization procedure takes place in vitro or
in vivo,38 the disposition of the pre-zygotes should be left solely to Maureen Kass’s
discretion.39 Third, the pre-divorce agreements were not dispositive of the situation
and were insufficiently clear to properly extract the intentions of the parties.40 With

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.

30

Id.

31

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154.

32

See generally, id.

33

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.

34

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154.

35

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

36

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154.

37

Id.

38

Havins & Dalessio, supra note 2, at 833 n.67. “In vitro fertilization means fertilization
outside of the body. In vivo fertilization means fertilization within life or, as applied here,
within the body.” Id.
39

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154.

40

Id.
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these determinations in mind, the court entered a judgment granting Maureen Kass
the exclusive right to determine the fate of the genetic material in dispute.41
IV. SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION
Following an appeal by Steven Kass, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York delivered a plurality opinion holding that the Kasses’ intentions
set forth in the May 12, 1993 consent forms and the June 7, 1993 uncontested
divorce agreement were sufficiently clear to properly determine the custodial
disposition of the frozen pre-zygotes.42 All five justices who served on the appellate
panel agreed that “the Supreme Court committed a fundamental error in equating a
prospective mother’s decision whether to undergo implantation of pre-zygotes,
which are the product of her participation in an IVF procedure, with a pregnant
woman’s right to exercise exclusive control over the fate of her non-viable fetus.”43
Rejecting the application of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court reasoned that a
woman’s right to privacy is not implicated until implantation actually occurs, for it is
only then that her bodily integrity is at issue.44
A. Majority
Holding that the controversies that arise as a result of IVF are “intensely personal
and essentially private manners which are appropriately resolved by the prospective
parents rather than the courts,” the majority applied standard theories of contract law
in order to reveal the intent of the parties from the pre-existing agreements.45 The
first inquiry turned on whether there were any objectively verifiable manifestations
of mutual intent by the parties.46 The majority, extracting the intent of the parties
from the document as a whole, determined that an unequivocal statement of intent
did exist between the parties, which could be identified in the informed consent
agreement.47 Looking at the language of the document, the court noted numerous
uses of plural subject tense such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our.’48 Additionally, at various
times throughout the document the couple demonstrated their desire to maintain
decisional authority, acknowledging “their joint right and obligation to provide for
the disposition of any frozen pre-zygotes in the event that they cannot render such
joint decision.”49
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 155.

44

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 155.

45

Id. at 162; see also John A. Robertson, Meaning What You Sign; Kass v. Kass Regarding
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, July 1, 1998, at 22 “Although
it may not be easy for couples to envision accurately their future wishes when they are focused
on achieving fertilization and pregnancy, the right to control future disposition by prior
directive seems clearly preferable to having a court decide.” Id.
46

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 155.

47

Id. at 158, 163.

48

Id. at 158.

49

Id.
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The court ultimately divided over the document’s failure to specifically list
divorce as a condition contemplated in the statement of intent for disposition. The
majority viewed the document against the backdrop of general contract law and
interpreted the provision as though death and incapacity were just examples of
conditions that could prevent a joint decision, rendering consideration of the parties’
intent appropriate.50 This holding contradicted the concurring and dissenting
justices’ conclusions that the two scenarios set forth, namely death and incapacity,
were the exclusive conditions that could trigger application of the provision in
question.51
The court next considered whether another section of the informed consent
document, which expressly addressed divorce, was binding. This portion of the
agreement provided that in the event of divorce, the legal ownership of the prezygotes should be resolved in a property settlement in a court of proper jurisdiction.52
The majority held that it did not state the dispositional intentions of the parties.53
Instead, the purpose of the provision was to confer jurisdiction upon a competent
court and to shield the hospital from liability if a legal dispute arose during the
couple’s divorce proceedings.54 The majority determined that the statement did not
diminish the expressed intent of the parties, which granted authority to the IVF
program to retain the pre-zygotes.55
The majority finally concluded that the informed consent document, viewed in its
entirety, “provides irrefutable evidence that the parties intended to have the IVF
program retain the stored pre-zygotes for study in the event that, as here, they were
unable to jointly agree on continued participation in the program.”56 Also, a
consideration of further manifestations of assent expressed by the parties through
drafting and signing the uncontested divorce agreement alleviated any doubts that
may have arisen regarding the intent of the parties.57
B. Concurrence
Finding the informed consent agreement to be “fatally ambiguous,” one judge
drafted a solo concurrence recognizing the financial and emotional burdens that
necessarily assist compelled fatherhood.58 The concurring judge reasoned that the
50

Id. at 159.

51

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 164, 176.

52

Id. at 160. Addendum No. 2-1 states, in pertinent part, “[I]n the event of divorce, we
understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property
settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id.
53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 160.

56

Id. at 161.

57

Id. at 163. “The documentary evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the parties in
this case made such a clear and unequivocal choice, and the plaintiff’s subsequent change of
heart cannot be permitted to unilaterally alter their mutual decision.” Id.
58
Id. at 165-66. In New York, parents are compelled to support their children until they
reach the age of 21. Currently, no means to voluntarily shield one parent from this obligation
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document stipulating the disposition of the pre-zygotes in the event of divorce
demonstrates that ambiguity exists within the pre-existing agreements because it was
signed in December 1993, six months after the parties first signed the
cryopreservation agreement.59 Along with deeming the agreement to be fatally
ambiguous, the opinion proposed that Steven Kass, as the objecting party, should
have extended veto power over his former spouse’s proposed efforts to implant the
frozen pre-zygotes.60
C. Dissent
Two judges joined in the dissent and emphasized the need to place weight on the
Tennessee Supreme Court decision from Davis v. Davis,61 because the facts were
almost analogous to the scenario in Kass.62 While Mary Sue and Junior Davis were
also involved in a custody dispute over the disposition of their cryopreserved prezygotes, the scenario in Davis deviates slightly from Kass because the couple did not
sign a dispositional agreement prior to participating in the IVF procedure.63 Like the
concurrence, the dissent professed that there was fatal ambiguity within the Kass’s
agreements that could not be resolved. Adopting the ‘balancing of interests’
approach proposed by the Davis court, the dissent departed from the concurring
opinion and placed equal emphasis on the interests of both of the parties involved
rather than giving the benefit of the doubt to the party protesting implantation.64
V. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Chief Justice Kaye delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals of
New York affirming the decision of the Appellate Division and holding that “the
informed consents signed by the parties unequivocally manifest their mutual
intention that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for research to
the IVF program.”65 Advancing the general rule that “agreements between
progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should
generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute,” the court
reasoned that the prior consent forms between the parties expressed their intent with

exist. Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 178; see also, Matter of Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 209 A.D.2d 298
(1994).
59

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 164.

60

Id. at 165.

61

842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).

62

Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 174.

63

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.

64

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178. According to the dissent below, “the immediate question
before [the court] is whether the burdens of unwanted paternity to the ‘would-not-be father’
exceed the deprivation of a possibly last opportunity for maternity to the ‘would-be mother’ in
this case.” Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 178.
65

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181.
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sufficient clarity.66 The court ordered that the pre-zygotes be given to the Mather
Hospital IVF program for use in reasonable research practices.67
Cryopreservation preserves fertilized genetic material for extended lengths of
time, inescapably leading to the possibility that minds and circumstances will change
while the pre-zygotes remain cryopreserved and ready for implantation. Reflecting
on this concept, the Court of Appeals sought the true intentions of the parties before
the couple’s tensions began to escalate.68 Chief Justice Kaye reinforced the
underlying premise that dispositional decisions should be left to the progenitors
rather than the courts and concluded that where an agreement exists that is
sufficiently definite to determine the intentions of the parties, it should control.69
The Court of Appeals employed reasoning similar to the Appellate Division and
relied on three common law principles governing contracts in order to examine the
prior consent agreement. First, the court professed to look within the four corners of
the contract to determine whether ambiguity existed.70 Second, examining the
agreement in its entirety, the court considered both the relationship of the parties and
the circumstances surrounding the agreement’s execution.71 Third, the court
determined that where the parties’ overall intentions cannot be extracted from
viewing the document in its entirety, the agreement should be construed to carry out
the plain intentions and objections of the parties that the court gathers.72 Applying
the three contract theories to analyze the agreement, Chief Justice Kaye concluded
that Mr. and Mrs. Kass plainly and clearly expressed that they wanted the power to
determine the disposition of the pre-zygotes to remain between them. This
conclusion was supported by the fact that the couple signed a document to proscribe
what should happen even in the event of unforeseen circumstances that would render
the parties unable to make a decision on their own.73
Finally, the court looked at the clause describing that in the event of divorce, the
disposition of the pre-zygotes should be determined in a property settlement.74
Acknowledging both the concurring and dissenting opinions from the Appellate
Division, the court conceded that the clause introduced ambiguity into the
agreement.75 In order to alleviate this ambiguity, the court examined the clause in
66

Id. at 180.

67

Id. at 181.

68

Id. at 180.

69

Id.

70

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (citing W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y.
1990)).
71
Id. The opinion quoted sound legal precedent derived from prior contract disputes
holding that “particular words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in
the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby.”
Id. at 180-81 (quoting Atwater & Co. v. Panama R.R. Co., 159 N.E. 418 (N.Y. 1927)).
72
Id. at 181 (citing Williams Press v. New York, 335 N.E.2d 299 (N.Y. 1975); Empire
Props Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 43 N.E.2d 25 (N.Y. 1942)).
73

Id.

74

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181.

75

Id.
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light of the document as a whole and sought additional assistance from the
uncontested divorce agreement drafted by Mrs. Kass.76 Ultimately, the court
determined that the intentions of the parties were clear enough to extract a
dispositional decision from the agreement.77
VI. ANALYSIS
The field of human reproductive technology is rapidly growing to meet the needs
of prospective parents. In the United States alone, roughly 45,000 couples per year
participate in IVF procedures in order to facilitate pregnancy and family life.78
Nearly 9,000 of these procedures immediately result in actual birth, yet many
fertilized eggs undergo the process of cryopreservation for future attempts at
implantation.79 Though the problem resolved in this case represents an issue of first
impression, the fact that some 100,000 cryopreserved pre-zygotes currently exist in
the United States80 suggests that disputes arising over their dispositions will continue
to occur. These astonishing statistics demonstrate a need to establish prudent
guidelines addressing the legal status and future disposition of genetic material.81
A. Balancing of Interests
The New York Court of Appeals reinforced the crucial notion that decisional
authority should be left to the parties, rather than the courts.82 If the parties’
statements of intent are sufficiently definite, it is not the responsibility of the court to
step in and overrule a pre-existing agreement. Nevertheless, after carefully reading
the opinions delivered by the New York courts, two questions inevitably arise. First,
did the parties contemplate divorce when signing the agreement that willed their
genetic material to the Mather Hospital IVF program? Second, does the court’s
determination that “unforeseen circumstances” includes the event of divorce
represent a sound legal conclusion? The Court of Appeals apparently engaged in a
careful inquiry in order to ascertain the true intentions of the parties involved in the
dispute. If, after observing all of the evidence, the court validly concluded that the
agreements between the parties clearly and correctly stated their true intentions, then
the decision was proper. However, if the court erroneously determined the sufficient
clarity of the prior consent agreement, then the balancing of interests approach
proposed by the court in Davis represents a better precedential analysis.
76

Id. at 182.

77

Id.

78

Judy Peres, Couple’s Divorce Entangles Frozen Embryos, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 7,
1999, at 1, Zone N.
79

Id.

80

Id.

81
See Elizabeth Neff, Behind Frozen Embryos Case Lies Consent Issue, CHICAGO DAILY
LAW BULLETIN, Sept. 30, 1999, at 3.
82

Robertson, supra note 45, at 22. “Such a rule has merit because it would ‘maximize
procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first
instance a quinticentially personal, private decision’. In addition, it would avoid costly
litigation and ‘provide the certainty needed for effective … IVF programs.’” Id.
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In 1992, the Supreme Court of Tennessee first addressed the issue regarding the
post-divorce disposition of Mary Sue and Junior Davis’s cryopreserved genetic
material.83 After thorough review of the situation, the court concluded the following:
Disputes involving the disposition of [pre-zygotes] produced by in vitro
fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the
progenitors. If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute,
then their prior agreement concerning the disposition should be carried
out. If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties
in using the [pre-zygotes] must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party wishing
to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of
[the pre-zygotes] in question.84
In light of the fact that the couple in Davis did not sign a pre-existing agreement,
the court applied a balancing of interests approach, taking into account the
contentions of the relevant parties, the gravity of their interests, and the relative
burdens that would be imposed by different solutions.85 The court weighed Mrs.
Davis’s interest in donating the genetic material to another couple against Mr.
Davis’s desire to avoid compelled fatherhood. Finding for Mr. Davis, the court
reasoned that “[d]onation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice – his
procreational autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with his offspring
would be prohibited.”86 Had Mrs. Davis opted to undergo implantation herself, the
court would have placed more weight on her dispositional desire, providing that
implantation was the only reasonable means by which she could obtain genetic
motherhood.87
Expanding upon the holding in Davis, where a pre-existing agreement exists that
is fatally ambiguous and the parties’ intentions cannot be determined from
examining the document, the court should balance the interests of the parties in order
to render a just decision. With respect to the Kass decision, Mrs. Kass wanted to
attempt implantation.88 In order to prevail, she would bear the burden of proving that
she is without any other reasonable means of obtaining genetic parenthood. On the
other hand, if Mrs. Kass failed to meet this burden, Mr. Kass, as the objecting party,
would be afforded the presumption of having the greater interest and should prevail.
B. Careful Drafting and Legislation
As a result of the Court of Appeals decision in Kass, New York precedent now
dictates that pre-existing agreements between couples that pronounce the disposition

83

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 603.

86

Id. at 604.

87

Id.

88

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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of their genetic material are binding and enforceable.89 Accordingly, other arms of
the law must evolve to ensure that divorce is an enumerated contingency within a
party’s dispositional agreement.90
In order to respond efficiently to the technological progress associated with
human reproductive technology, and to cryopreservation specifically, a two-tiered
approach is necessary to solve this novel legal dilemma.91 First, careful drafting by
attorneys is imperative in order to inform the parties involved of the purpose of a
pre-informed consent agreement.92 All foreseeable circumstances should be
discussed with the parties involved in IVF so that explicit directions regarding the
disposition of any genetic material can be expressly provided for in a written
agreement.93 Second, the human element involved in a cryopreservation scenario
presents a vital need to attend to dispositional disputes over genetic material in a
separate, non-judicial branch of government. Legislative action can and should be
taken to force couples to contemplate foreseeable events such as divorce and to seek
legal assistance in order to make binding agreements that emphatically state each
party’s intentions.94
Five months after the Kass decision, Chief Justice Kaye delivered a lecture at the
Fordham Law School, stating that “lawyering in a new age means, above all,
lawyering in a time of innovation and flux.”95 Mentioning Kass, Justice Kaye spoke
briefly about the effects that the rapidly growing and changing field of technology
has had on the legal world. She reminded her audience that such progress was
beyond contemplation only a few decades ago.96 As lawyers, the principle way to
respond to novel issues raised as a result of technological progress is to remember

89

Myrna Felder, Issues Raised by New Reproductive Techniques: ‘Kass v. Kass’, NEW
YORK L.J., June 10, 1998, at 3. “Any attorney counseling individuals about to participate in
an IVF program will do well to focus on the consent documents their clients are about to sign,
since we know from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Kass that, in New York State, those
agreements will be valid and enforceable.” Id.
90
Sheinbach, supra note 17, at 993. “Currently, no federal law exists to provide
uniformity with respect to disputes over embryo ownership and few states have legislation to
deal with the novel issues new reproductive technology presents.” Id.
91

See Neff, supra note 81, at 3. Recent court battles over frozen pre-zygotes demonstrates
the need for well drafted consent forms as well as new legislation regulating their contents. Id.
92

See id.

93

Robertson, supra note 45, at 23. “By implication, Kass also means that IVF programs
can rely on prior directives in disposing of frozen embryos, not just in the case of divorce, but
in the case of abandonment, failure to pay storage fees, inability to agree and other
contingencies.” Id.
94

Neff, supra note 81, at 3.

95

Judith S. Kaye, Remarks: Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
“Almost thirty years ago, Chief Justice Burger said that we could not afford to continue using
cracker-barrel corner grocer methods to operate courts on a supermarket age.” Id.
96

Id.
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that efficiency is a key value, but it is not the only important concern.97 Though
issues that arise may seem legally simple, profound social circumstances often exist
beyond the surface.98 This notion is especially applicable to the field of reproductive
science where lawyers can tailor their practices to address the highly sensitive human
issues surrounding medical procedures such as cryopreservation. From this frame of
reference, proper emphasis is focused on the need for attorneys to take time to
inform their clients about the occurrence of not only divorce, but of all foreseeable
conditions that may cause or prolong a marital dispute.99 Attorneys could then draft
agreements that clearly reflect the parties’ intentions should such disputes arise.100
This ‘beyond the surface approach’ used to address reproductive issues cannot be
the sole responsibility of the attorney. Through the state legislature, citizens can proactively respond to legal issues that arise in conjunction with cryopreservation by
implementing specific laws that act to safeguard couples from prospective
dispositional disputes. Regulations mandating that couples seek legal assistance
when drafting consent agreements will expedite the legal process by assuring the
court that the intentions of the parties are clearly stated after foreseeable future
occurrences have been contemplated. Several states have already begun to address
the possibility of dispositional disputes over genetic material by incorporating the
issue into state statutes.101
Florida and New Hampshire are two front-runner states that have passed
legislation dealing with reproductive technology. Though the Florida legislature
initiated minimal control over couples participating in IVF, New Hampshire
exercised a more invasive approach, heavily legislating the field of reproductive
technology. For example, Florida Statute § 742.17102 directs couples to execute a
written agreement that addresses the disposition of frozen pre-zygotes in the event of
several circumstances including divorce and death.103 Where such a document does
not exist, the statute grants all decisional authority to the donors of the genetic
97

Id. “When an ocean liner starts taking on water, you can devote a lot of your resources
to efficient bailing operations. You might also, however, want to look around for where the
leak is, or keep a closer watch for icebergs in the first place.” Id.
98

Kaye, supra note 95, at 2.

99

See Neff, supra note 81, at 3. “Provisions should be included for scenarios of divorce,
death, or incapacity. To think of every ‘what if’ scenario is part of a lawyers job. It’s
preventative legal work so hopefully you don’t end up with a court case.” Id.
100

Id.

101

See id. The New York legislature, presumptively responding to the Kass decision, has
initiated the drafting of a bill addressing this problem by requiring directives before treatment
explaining what should be done with genetic material in the event of specific situations such
as divorce, death, incapacity or abandonment. Id.
102

FLA. STAT. ch. 741.17 (1999) in relevant part states: “A commissioning couple and the
treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the
commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm and pre-embryos in the event of divorce, the death of a
spouse, or any other unforeseen circumstance.” Id.
103
Sheinbach, supra note 17, at 1006. “By prescribing a prior written agreement, Florida
forces IVF patients to consider specifically how they wish to dispose of any resulting embryos
before attempting to conceive through IVF.” Id.
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material; however, it does not address what should happen if the parties cannot reach
an agreement. New Hampshire, on the other hand, passed N.H. RSA 168-B:21104 to
ensure that IVF participants make informed decisions after seeking counseling and
exhibiting diligent reflection of all of the possible circumstances. The statute
requires that (1) a prior agreement be executed between the parties, and (2) judicial
authorization occur before any surgical procedure.105 Furthermore, a second statute,
N.H. RSA 168-B:18, calls for non-medical evaluation of the couple as well as a
home study to assess the ability of the persons involved to provide for a child.106
Perhaps a middle ground between these states’ legislative efforts would better
address the issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the initial intentions of Mr. and Mrs. Kass were the appropriate starting
point to begin a legal analysis, the human element involved in this dispute
necessarily warrants further examination of the interests of the parties involved.
When courts are called upon in the future to render a decision regarding the destiny
of genetic material, a pre-existing agreement should be strongly considered, but

104
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (1999). “Eligibility” In vitro fertilization and preembryo transfer shall be performed in accordance with rules adopted by the department of
health and human services and shall be available only to a woman: II. Who has been
medically evaluated and the results, documented in accordance with rules adopted by the
department of health and human services, demonstrate the medical acceptability of a woman
to undergo the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo transfer procedure; III. Who receives
counseling pursuant to RSA 168-B:18, and provides written certification of the counseling and
evaluation to the health care provider performing the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo
transfer procedure; and IV. Whose husband, if the recipient if married, receives appropriate
counseling, pursuant to RSA 168-B:18, and: (a) Successfully completes the medical
evaluation, if he is the gamete donor in the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo transfer
procedure; (b) Provides written certification of the non-medical counseling and any evaluation
to the health care provider performing the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo transfer
procedure; and (c) Indicates, by a writing, acceptance of the legal rights and responsibilities of
parenthood for any resulting child, unless the husband contributes his sperm for the in vitro
fertilization or pre-embryo transfer procedure. Id.
105

Sheinbach, supra note 17, at 1006.

106

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18 (1999). I. A non-medical evaluation shall be
performed on each party by a psychiatrist, psychologist, pastoral counselor or social worker,
who is licensed, certified, or authorized to practice under the laws and rules of the state of
New Hampshire, who shall maintain a record of the findings and conclusions and make a copy
available to the person evaluated. Each party shall waive any privilege against disclosure of
confidential communications and disclose a copy of the findings to the other parties prior to
entering the contract. A copy of the findings shall be filed with the court by each party, unless
good cause is shown. II. The person conducting the non-medical examination shall determine
the party’s suitability to parent by considering: (a) The ability and disposition of the person
being evaluated to give a child love, affection and guidance. (b) The ability of the person to
adjust to and assume the inherent risks of the contract. III. A home study if each party
involved shall be conducted by a licensed child placing agency or the department of health and
human services to assess the ability and disposition of the person to provide the child with
food, clothing, shelter, medical care and other basic necessities. A copy of the findings shall
be filed with the court by each party. Id.
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where ambiguity exists, it should not be dispositive. Instead, a functional approach
that seeks to balance the parties’ interests represents a better legal framework for
analyzing dispositional disputes. Additionally, if courts intend to enforce such
agreements as legally binding contracts, then lawyers must place emphasis on careful
drafting that demonstrates that the parties involved in reproductive technology have
made informed decisions. To help facilitate this procedure, state legislation must
evolve along with precedent to ensure that all foreseeable circumstances are expressly
provided for.

KELLY SUMMERS
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